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ii

ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE
DECLARATION REGARDING THE LOCATION OF THE
DRIVE-THROUGH FACILITIES WAS INCORRECT.

Wendy's argues that the trial court's interpretation of the Declaration in this
matter was correct. However, in setting forth this argument, Wendy's mischaracterizes
the trial court's interpretation and fails to properly acknowledge the relevant language of
the Declaration in the full context of the contract. The trial court's interpretation of the
Declaration, as it relates to the Drive-Through Facilities, is set forth in the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. at 375. In the Conclusions of Law, the trial court stated:
9.
Although the Declaration generally forbids the
construction of improvements on common areas, it expressly
authorizes Drive Through Facilities located on Parcel Three
as shown on the Plot Plan.
10.
The Drive Through Facilities are consequently
excepted from the Declaration's general prohibition of
improvements on the Common Area and are, in fact,
expressly permitted.
11.
Because the Drive Through Facilities are
expressly permitted by the Declaration, Wendy's is entitled to
a declaratory judgment decreeing that the Drive Through
Facilities may remain in use in their present location and
configuration.
R. at 380. Wendy's characterizes the Declarations language, and the trial court's decision
to mean that "Thus, so long as the plot plan shows a 'building featuring . . . drive through
traffic' on Parcel Three, the Declaration expressly authorizes such facilities." Wendy's
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Brief at p. 10. The actual language, taken in the context of the entire agreement
represented by the Declaration, demonstrates that the trial court's interpretation, and the
arguments supporting the same, are incorrect.
It is a common principle of contract interpretation in Utah that the overall context
in which a particular provision is used aids in interpretation of the contract. Draughon v.
CUNA Mutual Insurance Society, 111 P.2d 1105, 1108, fn 3. The Declaration establishes
a set of covenants and easements for the operation of an overall Shopping Center,
accounting for separate parcels covered by the terms of the Declaration. It defines
building areas and common areas within the Shopping Center, establishes easements,
provides for the maintenance of common areas of the Shopping Center in general, and
establishes restrictions regarding business on the property. In contemplation of the
Shopping Center which had yet to be constructed, at the time the Declaration was
created, a proposed site plan was attached as Exhibit "A." That proposed site plan is
referred to as the "Plot Plan." The Plot Plan, on its face, does not define a scale. It does,
however, clearly demonstrate measurements and distances relating to proposed shopping
center structures. In so doing, a scale can be derived for the Plot Plan.
While the Declaration affirmatively defines permitted practices and establishes
and entitles easement rights, it also sets forth restrictions on activity within the Shopping
Center property. In those restrictions, in Section 6, Paragraph A, it provides:
No building featuring drive-in, drive-up or drive-through
traffic shall be located on Parcel Three, except as shown on
2

the Plot Plan, without the prior consent of the owner of Parcel
Two and ASPI, including consent to the location of the drivein, drive-up or drive-through lanes of such facility.
The trial court and Wendy's read this provision to be permissive despite its
language which implies a restrictive meaning. Notwithstanding the fact that the entire
northerly portion of the drive through was eventually located on a parcel other than
Parcel Three, Wendy's asserts, and the trial court determined, that the location was
consistent with the Plot Plan.
Additionally, there is nothing on the face of the Plot Plan that suggests either party
contemplated a drive-through lane which would be physically isolated from the other
Common Area. The curved lines representing the location of the Drive-Through Facility
on the Plot Plan in no way suggest concrete curbing, raised landscape islands, and
exclusive possession by Wendy's of portions of the common area located on Parcel One.
However, that is precisely the circumstance that currently exists. The Declaration, even
read in the most liberal manner, would only allow a restaurant with drive-through
facilities located on Parcel Three. A significant portion of the Drive-Through Facilities in
this case are located on Parcel One which is owned by the Plaintiffs. For these reasons,
the trial court's interpretation was incorrect.
In their Brief, Wendy's also states that "Appellants do not dispute that the DriveThrough Facilities are physically located in the general location shown on the Plot Plan."
This statement is incorrect. See Brief of Plaintiffs/Appellants, pp. 5-6, «[fl[ 12-13. The
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purpose of the Mark Babbitt Affidavit was to demonstrate that neither the restaurant on
Parcel Three nor its appurtenant Drive-Through Facilities were located "as shown on the
Plot Plan." In fact, Mr. Babbitt's Affidavit unequivocally states his opinion that their
actual location is not consistent with the Plot Plan. A copy of Mr. Babbitt's Affidavit,
with the opposing Affidavit of Mr. Smith (both without exhibits), is included in the
Addendum to this Brief. These two Affidavits, completely disparate in their conclusions,
show that there were issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.
Wendy's further asserts:
Since some variability between a not-to-scale sketch in reality
is to be expected, the drafters of the Declaration must have
anticipated and intended to permit drive-through facilities in
the general location shown on the Plot Plan without regard to
precise measurements. Had the drafters generally been
concerned about the exact location of drive-through facilities,
they would surely have attached a considerably more detailed
survey or map to the Declaration than the Plot Plan.
Brief of Wendy's at pp. 11-12. These assertions are unsupported by any evidence.
Additionally, they run contrary to the trial court's award of summary judgment and the
procedure and rules on which this case was decided. Wendy's asserts that the trial court's
decision was correct as a matter of law, but this could only be so if the contract was
unambiguous. Gillmore v. Macey, 2005 UT App. 351, 121 P.3d 57.
There is clearly ambiguity in the contract regarding the proposed location of the
Drive-Through Facilities "[E]xcept as shown on the Plot Plan" is a phrase susceptible of
differing interpretations and subjective opinion. There is a clear dispute of material fact
4

regarding whether or not the as-constructed improvements are consistent with the Plot
Plan, Notwithstanding the ambiguity and inconsistent factual positions, Wendy's,
bolstered by the incorrect decision of the trial court, without basis or support, asserts the
intent of the drafters of the document. This is particularly interesting in light of the fact
that Wendy's is a latecomer to the property while Plaintiffs are the original owners.
Where there are genuine issues of material fact in the matter before the Court on
summary judgment, summary judgment is inappropriate. Lovendahl v. Jordan School
Dist., 2002 UT 130, 63 P.3d 705. In this case, where Mr. Babbitt's Affidavit clearly
introduced a dispute of material fact regarding consistency of the as constructed
restaurant and drive-through facilities with the Plot Plan, summary judgment should not
have been granted.
II.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT CONSENTED TO THE
LOCATION OF THE DRIVE-THROUGH FACILITY ON
THEIR PROPERTY.

Wendy's, for the first time on appeal, argues that Plaintiffs consented to the
location of the Drive-Through Facilities. It is well established that as a general rule,
appellate courts will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. Carrier v. Salt
Lake County, 2004 UT 98 % 13, 104 P.3d 1208. Further, Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, in subsection (a)(9) provides:
The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
Appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial
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court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of
the record relied on.
Based on the provisions of this Rule, Utah courts have noted that on appeal, litigants
have a duty to adequately brief the contentions and arguments in their briefs. Briefs must
contain reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority. State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d
299, 305 (UT 1998). An issue is inadequately briefed when "the overall analysis of the
issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing
court." Smith v. Smith 1999 UT App. 370, U 8, 995 P.2d 14, 16, citing State v. Thomas,
961P.2d299,305.
In Smith, the court noted that the brief of the Appellant presented three arguments
supported by five points. In reviewing the adequacy of the brief against the requirements
of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court noted that both the first
point and the second point failed to cite relevant legal authority. As to the third point, the
court noted that "it contains little more than a quote from Rule 35(b)(1) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure . . . ." Smith, 1999 UT App. 370, ^ 12. It is clear from the opinion that
the court found the lack of citation to any legal authority fatal.
In this case, under Point Heading II of its Brief, Wendy's argues that Plaintiffs
have consented to the location of the Drive-Through Facilities. However, Wendy's fails
to cite any legal authority to support its argument that the alleged, implied consent of the
Plaintiffs is legally relevant. Without any support in statutory or common law for the
theory it argues, it is clear that the burden of research has shifted to the Appellate Court
6

and Wendy's has failed to meet the requirements of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
Even if the Court were to consider the consent argument, raised for the first time
on appeal, it does not appear as though there is any support in Utah law for the assertion
that Plaintiffs consented to the location of the Drive-Through Facilities. If Wendy's
argument is construed to suggest that Plaintiffs consented to a modification of the
contract to allow the facilities to be constructed almost wholly on Plaintiffs' property (as
opposed to Parcel Three where the Declaration requires), the law of this State regarding
modification of contracts by consent precludes Wendy's claim. In Harris v. IES
Associates, Inc., 2003 UT App. 112, 69 P.3d 297, the Court of Appeals noted:
Parties to a contract may, by mutual consent, modify any or
all of a contract. . . . A valid modification of a contract . . .
requires a meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be
spelled out either expressly or implied with sufficient
definiteness.
Harris, 2003 UT App. 112, ^ 46. (cites omitted). Here, where neither of the parties, at the
time of construction of the Drive-Through Facilities, knew the improvements were
placed outside of Parcel Three, the Court cannot find the required meeting of the minds.
To the extent Wendy's argues that under the terms of the Declaration, as written,
it had the right to request approval for the location of the Drive-Through Facilities on
Plaintiffs' property, and that Plaintiffs were bound by a standard of reasonableness to
review and approve Wendy's proposal, Utah law also precludes the argument. It is well
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settled that a court may not make a better contract for the parties than they have made for
themselves. U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. General Inc., 1999 UT App. 303, 990 P.2d 945. In
this case, the terms of the Declaration simply require that no Drive-Through Facilities
shall be located on Parcel Three, except as shown on the Plot Plan, without the consent
of the owners of Parcels One and Two. There is nothing in the Declaration suggesting
that where no consent is sought, silence will imply consent. Clearly, as opposed to the
consent doctrine proposed by Wendy's, this is simply a matter of, at the outset, mutual
mistake, followed by a knowing trespass. In such circumstances, an allegation of consent
has no application or relevance under Utah law.
III.

WENDY'S ADDITIONAL MENU BOARD SIGNS ARE IN
VIOLATION OF THE DECLARATION.

In its Brief, Wendy's argues that the Declaration expressly permits the menu
board signs it has erected on its parcel and on Plaintiffs' property. Wendy's construction
of the Declaration is contrary to basic principles of Utah law. In addition, its argument
ignores the fact that it has constructed a new menu board sign on Parcel Three, as well as
a sign wholly located on the Plaintiffs' property. There is no provision of the Declaration
which authorizes this action.
The portion of the Declaration governing signs is set forth in Article VII. That
section provides:
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VII.

SIGNS.

Each Owner shall have the right to maintain such signs
on the interior of buildings located on its parcel as it desires,
whether or not such signs are visible from the exterior. As
permitted by local ordinances and other applicable
governmental regulations, each Owner shall have the right to
erect, maintain and replace signs on the exterior of buildings
located on its parcel; provided, in no event shall signs be
located on the roofs (excluding canopies so long as no sign is
erected on a canopy which sign will extend above the height
of the building roof) of any buildings in the Shopping Center
without the prior written consent of all Owners and ASPI.
The Owners of Parcels One and Two shall have the
right to construct from time to time any sign or signs it deems
advisable on its parcels.
The Owner of Parcel Three shall have the right to
construct two (2) free-standing pylon, monument or other
signs at the located designed on the Plot Plan as ''Parcel
Three Sign. " No other pylon, monument or other freestanding sign shall be permitted on Parcel Three without the
prior written approval of all Owners and ASPL
R. at 39-40 (emphasis added). Wendy's argues that under the doctrine of ejusdem
generis, the terms are to be so construed that the menu board signs are not "other freestanding signs" which would be expressly prohibited by the Declaration. Wendy's asserts
that the doctrine of ejusdem generis requires the Court to conclude that "other free
standing signs" includes only signs similar to pylon or monument signs. This is incorrect.
The doctrine of ejusdem generis, will not apply where the contract language itself
expresses a contrary intention. State v. Piep, 2004 UT App. 7, 1f 10, 84 P.3d 850, 852.
More significantly however, the doctrine does not serve to require the court to construe
9

"any other free standing sign," as referring only to "signs similar to pylon or monument
signs." See Brief of Wendy's at pp. 16-17. The doctrine requires interpretation of the
term from the context in which it appears.
In the context of the entire Article VII of the Declaration, and where the Section
expressly prohibits signs other than at the locations identified on the Plot Plan, the
reference to "or other free standing signs" cannot be read as Wendy's suggests, but must
be given the plainly broad intent to include and encompass all other categories of signs.
To further support their argument, Wendy's has provided dictionary definitions for a
pylon or a monument. Reference to actual sign ordinances with definitions of pylon
signs, monument signs and free-standing signs is more instructive.
Section 9-26-030 of the Draper City Municipal Code, Draper City, Utah, defines a
"freestanding sign" as "A sign which is self-supported by poles, pylons or other
structural supports mounted in the ground." Chapter 17.12 of the Sign Ordinance of Big
Bear Lake, California defines a freestanding sign as "Any sign supported by structures or
supports that are placed on or anchored in the ground which are independent from any
building or other structure. This definition may include pole signs, ground signs and
monument signs." Although the Salt Lake County sign ordinance in effect at the time of
construction at the Shopping Center does not contain a definition for a "freestanding
sign," it does contain a definition for a "monument sign" which reads "A sign which is
incorporated into the landscape or architectural design scheme displaying the name of
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uses or buildings." A complete copy of the Salt Lake County sign ordinance in effect in
1983 is included in the Addendum to this Brief. Reference to that ordinance makes it
clear that in the context of that ordinance, the term "other free-standing sign" would
include any type of sign except roof signs and those signs attached to a building, such as
wall signs and projecting signs. The menu board signs constructed by Wendy's would
certainly be defined as "other free standing signs" in the context of the Salt Lake County
sign ordinance.
Reference to the Record also indicates that Wendy's locational characterization of
signs is incorrect. The photograph at p. 288 in the Record, attached to the Affidavit of
Steve Marshall, demonstrates two of the signs constructed by Wendy's. The "pick-up
window" sign in the immediate foreground is located wholly on Plaintiffs' property.
Plaintiffs believe, and common sense indicates, that such a sign is a "directional sign."
However, because the sign has been constructed wholly on the Plaintiffs' property, it is
not permitted under the Declaration. The language of the Declaration indicates that
Wendy's only has authorization to construct directional signs on Parcel Three.
The sign in the background of the picture found at p. 288 of the Record is clearly
not a "directional sign." Accordingly, that sign is also in violation of the express terms of
the Declaration and must be removed.
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IV.

EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD CLEARLY INDICATES THAT
WENDY'S CONSTRUCTED NEW FACILITIES ON PLAINTIFFS'
PROPERTY AND TRESPASSED IN DOING SO.

In its Brief Wendy's takes issue with Plaintiffs' assertion that Wendy's
constructed a new fence on Plaintiffs' property. Wendy's asserts that there is no evidence
in the record to support that assertion. See Brief of Wendy's at p. 19, fn 2. This assertion
is incorrect.
The Larsen & Malmquist survey, which is attached to Plaintiffs' Complaint set
forth at p. 9 of the Record, clearly identifies a chain link fence on the western border of
the Drive-Through Facilities. However, the photographs beginning at p. 285 of the
Record clearly show a rod-iron fence in Wendy's corporate colors along the western
border of the Drive-Through Facilities where the chain link fence was previously located.
Obviously, Wendy's constructed the rod-iron fence, with one panel on Plaintiffs'
property, with its renovation of the restaurant. Such construction was clearly not outside
the applicable statute of limitations. In addition, as previously discussed, the Wendy's
directional sign as shown on p. 288 of the Record was installed by Wendy's on Plaintiffs'
property at a time that is clearly within the applicable statute of limitations. Further,
while Wendy's takes issue in its Brief with Plaintiffs' assertion of the new fence being
built, Wendy's does not deny that it installed the new sign on Plaintiffs' property. At the
very least, the evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact which should have
precluded summary judgment on the trespass issue. Lovendahl, 2002 UT 130.
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Accordingly, the trial court's decision granting summary judgment on the trespass claims
was incorrect.
CONCLUSION
From the Record in this case it is apparent that the trial court improperly
interpreted the Declaration. Additionally, the trial court missed significant factual
disagreements which should have precluded its award of summary judgment to Wendy's.
Finally, the trial court ignored evidence that Wendy's trespassed on Plaintiffs' property
to build a fence and install signs, well within the applicable statute of limitations. For all
of the foregoing reasons, the trial court's summary judgment determination should be
overturned in its entirety and the case remanded to the trial court for consideration on the
merits.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this %?J? day of November, 2006.
MAZURAN & HAYES, P.C.

Attorneys foFPtamtiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on \h&^J(

day of November, 2006,1 caused to be served a

true and correct copy of the foregoing by mailing, postage prepaid, first-class United
States mail, to the following:
Ronald G. Russell, Esq.
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Post Office Box 11019
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0019
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ADDENDUM
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Michael Z. Hayes and Todd J. Godfrey
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2118 East 3900 South
Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Telephone: (801)272-8998

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

PAPANIKOLAS BROTHERS ENTERPRISES, LC,
AND WHITE INVESTMENT COMPANY, INC.
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF
MARK E. BABBITT

vs.
WENDY'S OLD FASHIONED
HAMBURGERS OF NEW YORK, INC.,

Civil No. 040915948PR
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

Mark E. Babbitt, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am over the age of twenty-one years and I have personal knowledge
of the matters stated herein. If called as witness in this case, I would
testify to the matters stated in this affidavit.

2. I am Vice President of Great Basin Engineering Inc., a civil
engineering and land surveying firm located in Ogden, Utah. I am also
a Professional Land Surveyor licensed by the State of Utah holding
license number 166484 and a Professional Engineer licensed by the
State of Utah holding license number 6728.
3. I have reviewed the ALTA/ACSM Land Title Survey for Wendy's
International Inc. dated 14 November 2002, with general corrections
dated 18 November, 2002 prepared by Larsen & Malmquist (Larsen)
and signed by Kim Wayne Lundberg on 19 November, 2002.
4. I have carefully measured the existing building location and the drive
thru window access location north of the building with respect to the
property lines shown on the Larsen survey. (I have measured the
drawing because there are no North-South dimensions shown on the
drawing locating the building or access with regard to the property
lines, however East-West dimensions are shown.) These
measurements are as follows: Distance from South property line of
Wendy's (North right-of-way line of 3300 South Street) to the
southwest corner of building measures approximately 38.3 feet, the
North-South measurement along the West side of the building
measures approximately 76.9 feet, the distance from the Northwest
corner of the building to the North property measures approximately
25.2 feet. The South edge of curbing along the South side of the drive
thru access lane appears to approximately match (within 0.5 feet) the

North property line, for approximately 40 feet (beginning at the
Northeast corner of the survey and then going West) until the access
lane begins curving to the South. This access lane is approximately 13
feet wide and for 40, feet as indicated above, is entirely North of the
Wendy's Property and then turns South. After approximately 70.5 feet
from said Northeast corner, the access is entirely on Wendy's
Property.
5. The Larsen Survey also shows a landscaped area North of the access
lane that is maintained as part of the Wendy's facility. This landscaped
area is bounded by a 6-inch curb wall on the Northerly, Easterly and
Southerly sides and a retaining wall on the West side. The overall
landscaped area has an area of approximately 625 square feet with
approximately 490 square feet North of the Wendy's property line.
6. The "Plot Plan" appended as Exhibit "A" to the declaration shows the
building now owned by Wendy's located in the southwest corner of
Parcel three and also shows by two curved lines located just off the
northwest corner of the Wendy's building, the drive thru facility which
serves the Wendy's building.
7.

I have measured the location of the building and the curved lines
representing the drive thru on the "Plot Plan" (Exhibit A) by measuring
dimensioned lines throughout Exhibit A and approximating the scale of
the drawing to be 1" = 125'. Measurements corresponding to those
stated in Item 3 are as follows:

North right-of-way line to buiiding

30' +

North/South Dimension through building

64' +

Building to North property line of Wendy's

46' +

Dimensions to north edge of access drive:
at NE property corner

11.5' +

at 40'West of NE corner

3' +

at 51 ' West of NE corner

0' +

8. The Plot Plan is labeled as "Proposed Site Plan," which is indicative of
a preliminary layout, not as a constructed drawing or a survey. The
physical relationship between the location of the restaurant building
and drive thru as shown on the Plot Plan is not consistent in scale with
the physical location of the building and drive thru facility as physically
located on the ground.
9. The dimensions I have listed in Items 4 and 7 above, although only
approximate, show a significant difference in the location of the
building and the drive thru window access. The building on Exhibit A is
30 feet + from the North right-of-way line versus 38.3 feet on the
survey. The building in Exhibit A is approximately 64 feet long versus
76.9 feet on the survey. The North property line in Exhibit A is
approximately 46 feet from the building versus 25.2 feet in the survey.
The North edge of the access for the drive thru window in Exhibit A
angles to the Southwest and is from 2 feet to over 10 feet closer to
Wendy's north property line than the access shown on Wendy's

survey. Approximately 480 square feet of the access lane shown on
the Larsen Survey is North of the North edge of the access lane shown
on Exhibit 'A'.

DATED this

day of October, 2005.

luA i/?du4
Mark E. Babbitt

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this fy

day of

October, 2005

LAURIE HALL
NOTARY PU8UC . SMTE of UTJW
2073 West 5025 South
Roy.UT M067
COMM.EXP. H-»-K»7

My Commission Expires:

/ / - : ? £ - 7L0c>7

AuAt££fsm<£>£-~^

NOTARY PUBLIC

Residing in 'Ro*,

U£*/*~

Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
Attorneys for Defendant
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Post Office Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019
Telephone: (801)532-7840

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

METROPOLITAN SQUARE ASSOCIATES,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WENDY'S OLD FASHIONED
HAMBURGERS OF NEW YORK, INC.,

]
I
I
)

AFFIDAVIT OF
RANDY D. SMITH

ji
;I

Civil No. 040915948PR
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

Randy D. Smith, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am over the age of twenty-one years and I have personal knowledge of the

matters stated herein. If called as a witness in this case, I would testify to the matters stated
in this affidavit.

2.

I am Vice President of Larsen & Malmquist, Inc., a civil engineering firm

located in Salt Lake City, Utah, I am also a Professional Land Surveyor licensed by the
State of Utah holding license number 51527Q8.
3.

On November 14, 2002, our office prepared an ALTA/ACSM land title survey

at the request of Wendy's International of the property located at 3259 East 3300 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah. I personally performed the field work for the survey of the Wendy's
property and assisted in the drafting of the survey map. A true and correct copy of the
survey map prepared by my office of the Wendy's property (the f,LMI Survey") is attached
hereto marked Exhibit ,fA."
4.

In conducting a survey, it is standard practice to research and locate other

prior surveys of the subject property. In connection with the preparation of the Wendy's
survey, I researched and located prior surveys of the property filed with the Salt Lake
County Surveyor's office, which included surveys prepared by the Salt Lake City surveying
firm of Bush & Gudgell in-1989 and 1992 (the "B&G Surveys"). Copies of those prior
surveys are attached hereto marked as Exhibits "B" and "C"
5.

The location and layout of the drive through lane and curbing as shown on the

LMI Survey is in the same location as shown on the B&G Surveys.
6.

The drive through lane and related curbing are in the same location and same

configuration as they existed at the time of the LMI Survey and no modification was made
to the drive through lane and curbing locations or otherwise to the location of the site
2

improvements on the Wendy's property during Wendy's renovation of the restaurant
building.
7.

I have read and I am familiar with the "Declaration of Restrictions and Grant

of Easements" recorded as Entry No. 3714292, in Book 5410, at Page 823 of the records of
the Salt Lake County, Utah Recorder and I have reviewed Exhibit "A" attached thereto. A
true and correct copy of the declaration is attached hereto marked Exhibit "D."
8.

The "Plot Plan" appended as Exhibit "A" to the declaration shows the building

now owned by Wendy's located in the southwest corner of Parcel Three and also shows,
by two curved lines located just off the northwest corner of the Wendy's building, the drive
through facility which serves the Wendy's building.
9.

It is my professional opinion that the curved lines on the Plot Plan depict a

drive through facility in the same location as the drive through*facility that is shown on the
LMI Survey and the B&G Surveys and which currently serves the Wendy's restaurant
10. The Plot Plan is labeled as "Proposed Site Plan," which is indicative of a
preliminary layout, not an as constructed drawing or a survey. The physical relationship,
however, between the location of the restaurant building and drive through as shown on
the Plot Plan is fully consistent in scale with the physical location of the building and drive
through facility as physically located on the ground.
11.

The line running east and west, located to the north of the Wendy's property,

does not accurately depict the location of a property line. The north property line of the
3

Wendy's parcel, which is accurately depicted on the LMI Survey, runs along the south edge
of the drive through facility and is on the same line extended as the north side of the
building located to the west of the Wendy's property, as shown in the photographs
attached hereto marked Exhibits ME" and "F."
12. The areas hatched with a dot pattern on the Plot Plan, indicating the location
of the access drive, are consistent with the layout of the curb, gutter, and parking located to
the north of the Wendy's building,
DATED this / ^

day of April, 2005,

Randy D. Smith
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /?**

day of April, 2005.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing In t
My Commission Expires:

*
Notary PuMIc,~ ^
PATRICIA H.URSEN I
m
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SIGN ORDINANCE
Eff. 2-13-81 Sections:
22-33-1.
22-33-2.
22-33-322-33-422-33-3.
22-33-6.
22-33-7.
22-33-8.
22-33-9.
22-33-10,
22-33-11.
22-33-12,
22-33-13.
22-33-14,
22-33-15.
22-33-16.
22-33-1722-33-18.
22-33-19-

Purpose
Interpretation
Exceptions
Definitions
Signs to Conform
Building Permit Exception:;
Permit Tag
Legal Action
Signs Not to Constitute a Traffic Hazard
Clear View of Intersecting Streets
Signs on Fublic Property
Prohibited Signs
Maintenance of and Abandonment of Sign
Ownership
Lighted Signs
Spacing Requirements For Off-Premise Signs
Size Computation
Mobile Changeable Copy Sign
Signs Allowed by Zones

Sec. 22-33-1. Purpose. The purpose of this ordinance is to eliminate
excessive and confusing sign displays that create potential hazards to
motorists, pedestrians, propertyt and also to maintain a responsible
communication system by setting requirements for the location, size, height,
and lighting of signs that will be compatible with the architecture and
landscape of Salt Lake County.
Sec, 22-33-2. Interpretation. The sign requirements contained herein are
declared to be the maximum allowable, and sign types not specifically allowed
as set forth within this chapter shall be prohibited. Where other ordinances
are in conflict with the provisions of this ordinance, the most restrictive
ordinance shall applySec. 22-33-3.

Exceptions.

(1) When a parcel of land is five (5) acres, or larger, the Planning
Commission may consider an on-premise sign proposal for a development on
such parcel that is less restrictive than the regulations set forth herein,
as a conditional use providing there is a determination that the proposed
sign exceptions are:
(a)
(b)

Not iu conflict with the purpose of this chapter.
In architectural harmony with the development and
other buildings and uses adjacent to the development*
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(2)

22-33-3 - 22-33-4

Signs not regulated by this chapter:
(a)

(b)
(c)
(d)
Sec. 22-33-4.

On-premise advertising signs that are attached to windows
or walls and are clearly of a temporary nature, which
promote specific sales.
Signs which are associated with school or church events
and functions, which are clearly of a temporary nature.
Interior signs,
Time and temperature devices.
Definitions.

Alterations- A change or rearrangement in the structural parts or design
whether by extending on a side, by increasing in area or height, or by relocating or change in position.
Nonconforming Sign or Sign Structure. A sign or sign structure or portion
thereof lawfully existing at the effective date of this chapter which does
not conform to all height, area, yard spacing, animation, lighting or other
regulations prescribed in the zone in which it is located.
Sign. "Sign11 shall mean and include every advertising message, announcement,
declaration, demonstration, display, illustration, insignia surface or space
erected or maintained in view of the observer thereof for identification,
advertisement or promotion of the interests of any person, entity, product,
or service. Sign shall also include the sign structure supports, lighting
system and any attachments, ornaments or other features used to draw the
attention of observers,
"A"1 Frame Sign. Temporary and/or movable sign constructed with
two sides attached at the top so as to allow the sign to stand
in an upright position. (Figure 1 ) .
Advertising Sign.

Off-premise sign.

Animated Sign. A sign which induces motion or rotation of any part
by mechanical, or artificial means, or subdued color changes*
Balloon Si^n. Advertisement supported by a balloon anchored to the
premises where the advertised use is conducted, product or commodity
sold, service performed, or business name is located.
Billboard Sign.
Business Sign.

An off-premise advertising sign.
An on-premise sign.

Construction Sign. A sign identifying an existing or proposed
development project which may contain the name of the project, name
and address of construction firms, architects, engineers, developers,
etc.
Flashing Sign. A sign which has or appears to have motion or
rotation of the lighting elements or displays flashing or intermittent light.
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22-.33-4 ~ 22-33-4

Flat Sign, A sign erected parallel to and attached to the outside
wall of a building and extending not more than twenty-four (24)
inches fro™ such wall with messages or copy on the face side only*
(Figure 10)
Flood 1 i_ght:edSign« A sign made legible in the absence of daylight
by devices which reflect or project light upon it*
Ground Sign. A sign supported by a fixed permanent frame support
in the ground. (Figure 11)
Illuminated Sign- A sign which has characters, letters, fLgures,
designs, or outlines illuminated by electric lights or luminous
tubes.
Interior Sign* A sign located within a building so as to be visible
only from within the building in which the sign is located.
Mobile, Changeable Copy Sj^n. A sign mounted on trailer oir frame,
lighted or unllghted, with changeable lettering. (Figure 13)
Monument Sign* A sign which is incorporated into the landscape or
architectural design scheme and displaying the name of uses or
buildings• (Figure 14)
Name Plate Sign. A sign indicating the name and/or occupation of
a person legally occupying the premise or indicating a legal home
occupation thereon.
Off-Premise Signs. An advertising sign which directs attention to
a use, product, commodity, or service not related to the premises
on which the sign is located.
On-Premise Sign, A sign directing attention to a use conducted,
product or commodity sold, service performed or business name upon
the premises on which it is located.
Overhanging Sign, A sign which projects twelve (12) inches or more
over the roof of a building. (Figure 15)
Pedestal Si fin» A temporary and/or movable &ign supported by a
column(s) and a base so as to allow the sign to stand in an upright
position. (Figure 16)
Projecting Sign. A sign attached to a building or canopy and extending in whole or part more than twenty-four (24). inches beyond
any wall of the building or canopy. (Figure 17)
Property Sign. A sign related to the property upon which it is
located and offering such information as address, name of occupant
for residential uses, sale or lease of the property, warning
against trespassing, any hazard, or other danger on the property.
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22-33-4 - 22-33-4

Zl9.g9£LQg.g.Jr-Board Sign, A permanently attached changeable copy wifcr,
not exceeding twenty (20) square feet per face with one or two f '.uie.s
back to back for the display of promotional items offered for sale on
the premises*
Roof Sign* A sign which is erected partly or wholly on the roof of the
building. Not withstanding the foregoing, a sign structure having main
supports embedded in the ground shall not be considered t:o be a roof
sign even if the sign's supports pass through a roof, canopy, or parapet
of a building. (Figure 18)
Service Sign. A sign that is incidental to use lawfully occupying the
property upon which the sign is located and which sign is necessary to
provide information to the public, such as direction to parking lots,
location of restrooms, entrance and exits, etc* A service sign shall
also include signs providing information about sale of agricultural
products produced upon the premises.
Snipe Sign, A sign which is attached to a public utility pole, or the
supports for another sign. (Figure 19)
Temporary Sign. "Temporary Sign" as regulated by this title shall
include any sign, banner, pennant, valance or advertising display constructed of paper, cloth, canvas, light fabric, cardboard, wallboard or
other light materials, with or without frames, intended to be displayed
out of doors for a short period of time.
Time and Temperature Device, Any mechanism that displays the time and/or
temperature,, but does not display any commercial advertising or
identification.
Wall Sign. A sign that is either painted on a wall or its facing, by
not having a sign frame or separation from the wall or facing.
(Figure 20)
Window Sifin. A sign permanently attached and located within a building
so as to be visible through a window or door outside of the building.
(Figure 21)
Electronic Message Center. A mechanism or device which uses a combination of lights or lighted panels which are controlled electrically
and electronically to produce words, symbols or messages which may
flash) travel or scintillate within a given panel area.
Sign Area. The area of a sign that is used for display purposes,
excluding the minimum frame and supports. In computing sign area, only
one side of a back-to-back or double-faced sign shall be computed when
signs are parallel or diverge from a common edge by an angle of not
more than forty-five degrees.
In relation to signs that do not have a frame or a separate background,
sign area shall be computed on the basis of the least rectangle,
triangle or circle large enough to frame the display.
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22-33-4 - 22-33-7

Sign areas in the shapp. of n sphere, prism, cylinder, cone, pyramid,
square or other such shapes shall be computed as one-half (h) of the
total surface area. {Figures 2-9)
Sign Maintenance, "Sign Maintenance" shall mean that signs shall be
maintained in a safe, presentable and good condition, including the
replacement of defective parts, repainting, cleaning, and o t h w acts
required for the maintenance of said sign*
Sign Setback* The minimum distance that any portion of a sigr or sign
structure shall be from any street right-of-way line and yard line
coterminous with a street.
Sign Structure, Anything constructed or erected supporting a sign
which requires locations on or below the ground or attached to
something having location on or below the ground.
Sec, 22-33-5.

Signs to Conform.

Except as provided in this title:

(1) A sign shall not be erected, raised, moved, placed, reconstructed,
extended, enlarged or altered, unless in conformity with the regulations
herein specified*
A nonconforming sign shall not be reconstructed, raised, moved, placed,
extended, or enlarged unless said sign is changed so as to conform to all
provisions of this title. Alterations shall also mean the changing of the
text or message that the sign is conveying from one use of the premise to
another use of the premise and the changing of the ownership of the sign when
that ownership necessitates a change in the text or message of the ?:ign.
Alterations shall not be interpreted to include changing the text or copy of
off-premise advertising signs, theatre signs, outdoor bulletin or other
similar signs which are designed to accommodate changeable copy.
Sec. 22-33-6. Building Permit Exceptions. Property signs, political signs
and nameplates conforming to the provisions of this chapter may be erected
without a permit. (See Section 22-33-3(2)*
Sec, 22-33-7, Permit Tag. Each new sign requiring a building permit after
the effective date of this chapter, and complying with this ordinance, shall
have affixed to the sign a certification tag, issued by the Planning Director,
visible from the sidewalk or nearest convenient location,
(1) Tag Data, Each tag shall be of a weatherproof material and shall
have the permit number of the sign for which it is issued and a date or
code number which corresponds to the issuance record retained in the
county office which issues the tag,
(2) Tag Issuance. The tag shall be issued by the Building Inspection
office at the time the sign permit is issued and the permit fee paid.
(3) Tag Installation. Inspection tags shall be applied only to the
signs for which they are issued by the sign contractor or the sign
owner to certify to the Building Inspection Department that the placement and construction of the signs are in conformance with representations
made in permit applications, and that work is completed.
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Sec, 22-33-8.

22-33-8 - 22-33-11

Legal Action.

(1) The Board of County Commissioners or County Attorney shall be
empowered to institute any appropriate action or proceeding in any case
where any sign is erected, constructed, reconstructed, altered, repaired,
converted, or maintained, or in any case where any sign is used in violation
of any County Ordinance, to accomplish the following purposes:
(a)

To prevent such unlawful erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, conversion, maintenance,
or use•

(b)

To restrain, to correct or abate such violation.

(c)

To abate and remove unsafe or dangerous sign. If an unsafe
or dangerous sign is not repaired or made safe within ten
(10) working days after giving notice as provided in Subsection (2) below, the Building Inspector or Planning
Director may at once abate and remove said sign, and the
person having charge, control or benefit of any such sign
shall pay to Salt Lake County the costs incurred in such
removal within thirty (30) calendar days after written
notice of the costs is mailed to such person,

(2) Notice by the County shall mean written notice sent by certified
mail to persons having charge or control or benefit of any sign found by the
Building Inspector or Planning Director to be unsafe.
GENERAL SIGN PROVISION
Sec. 22-33-9. Sisns Not to Constitute a Traffic Hazard. Signs or other
advertising structures shall not be erected at the intersection of any streets
or driveways in such manner as to obstruct free and clear vision;
or at any
location where by reason of the position, shape or color, it may interfere
with, obstruct the view of or be confused with any authorized traffic sign,
signal device, or make use of the words "Stop", "Drive-in11, "Danger11, or any
other words, phrases, symbol or character in such a manner as to interfere
with, mislead or confuse vehicle operators.
Sec, 22-33-10. Clear View of Intersecting Streets. There shall be a minimum
clearance of eight (8) feet between the ground and any part of a projecting
sign or ground sign, as measured from the grade of the intersecting streets
which are located within the clear view of an intersection as defined in
Section 22-1-15. (Figure 22)
.Sec. 22-33*11. Sjg;ns on Public Property. No sign shall be located on
publicly owned land or inside street rights-of-way except signs required and
erected by permission of an authorized public agency. Signs shall include>
but not be limited to, handbills, posters, advertisements or notices that
are fastened, placed, posted, painted or attached in any way upon any curbstone, lamp post, telephone pole, telegraph pole, electric light or power
pole, hydrant, bridge, tree, rock, sidewalk, or street?
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22-33-12 - 22-33-18

$ec._ 22-33-12, Pnjh^bJjeJ_S.Lgug_-_
Signs not specifically allowed by this
chapter" are prohibited- The foJl-'wuig uigns are specifically prohibited:
tT n
A frame, snipe and pedestal ciam;.
Sec, 22-33-13,

Maintenance of and Al.andcmroent of Sign,

(1) All signs and advertising structures shall be maintained ir good
condition.
(2) Signs relating to a product no longer available for purchase, or
to a business which has moved, shall be removed or the advertising copy
removed within thirty (30) days of such unavailability, closure or relocation.
See. 22-33-.14. Ownership> The imprint of the sign owner and sign erector
of all signs shall be in plain and public view.
Sec. 22-33-15. Lighted Signs, A lighted sign shall not be installed which
permits the light to penetrate beyond the property in such a manner a-s to
annoy or interfere with the use of adjacent properties;.
Such lights alleged to violate the above by the adjacent property owners
or Planning Director shall be subject to a public hearing before the Planning
Commission as to the validity of the alleged violation. If such light: is
determined to be in violation, the owner of said light shall take appropriate
corrective action as directed.
Sec, 22-33-16, Spacing Requirements for Off-Premise Signs, Off-premise
signs erected along interstate highways on the primary system and on the
federal aid system as defined by the State of Utah shall conform with the
provisions of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act.
Sec. 22-33-17. Size Computation.
calculating sign sizes:

The following shall be used when

When more than one use occupies a lot the frontage may
the sign sizes for one total of a ground or projecting
use. The total may then be divided between the uses.
number of flat or wall signs provided their total does
percentage of wall area coverage allowed.

be used to calculate
sign, not for each
There may be any
not exceed the

Sec. 22-33-18, Mobile Changeable Copy Siftn. One mobi3e changeable copy
sign may be used for each use for a period of sixty (60) days following the
issuance of a permit to construct a permanent sign for that use. Upon inspection and approval of the permanent sign* tho mobile changeable copy sign
must be removed.
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Sec, 22-33-19.

Signs Allowed by Zones are ax Follow^:

ZONE

SIGN

(1) All
Zones

SIZE

22-33-19

HEIGHT

Construction | 32 sq, ft. plus 1 sq. 12 ft.
ft. for each 101 of
max*
frontage over 30 to
a maximum of 96 sq,
ft. per lot

LOCATION
On private
property

j

OTHER
Sign must he removn-c
6 months from final
building or conditional use inspection
that allow* occupancy
or when 1UGX of the
facilities are occupied, whichever
occurs first

Construction signs
20 ft. On private
located on the deproperty
velopment for
subdivisions of 5
|
lots or more, may be
32 sq, ft, plus 2 sq.
ft. for each additional lot over 5
to a maximum of 128
sq, ft. total per
subdivision

20 ft, On private
property

Signs for subdivision
of 5" lots or more and
not located on the
development may be
32 sq- ft, plus 1 sq,
ft. for each lot over
5 to a maximum of 64
sq, ft. per sign

Name Plate

I

:3 sq, ft. maximum
?er use

i

All signs must be
approved by the
Planning CoiomJsslott
for a period not tu
exceed one year which
may be renewed upon
application received
at least 30 days
prior to the previous
approval expiration
date

i Attached to 1

Main
Structure

Political

16 sq, ft- maximum

6 ft.

Shall be removed 15
On private
days following the
property and
not closer j final voting day
than 10 ft. tq
a driveway 1

Property

6 sq. ft.

6 ft.

On private
property
- — * _
, L
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ZONE

SIGN

(1) All I Service
2ones
(cont'd)

Monument

Flat

J2-33-19 - 22

SIZE

HEIGHT

I 6 acj. ft- ,

LOCATION

3)-iJ

OTHFR

!3 'ft.'""[On private
k/hen
property
[free
standing

32 sq* ft* plus 1
6 fc.
I sq. ft. for every 10'
of frontage over 30 f
to a maximum of 64
sq, ft.

15% of a wall
surface

On private
property
|and set back
6 ft. from
property
lines

One sign per street
frontage and landscoped appropriately
for the site. Allowed
with public or quasi public buildings or
uses* planned unit d e velopments, golf
courses, cemeteries,
and dwelling groups

Attached to
a building

Allowed with public
or quasi-public
building, planned
unit developments,
golf courses,
cemeteries, dwelling
groups

Illumination may be built into or attached on to the signs listed above when:
(1) Lighting is allowed in the specific zon e or
(2) The devel opmenL occupies more tflan 500 feet continuous frontage on the
street the sign will face and the sign is not closer than 100 feet to a
property not allowed an illuminated sign
(3)
Flat signs that are exposed to dwellings on adjacent properties shall
not be illuminated (property divided by public streets are not adjacent)

(2) R-M
S-l-G
K-4-8,5
RMH

On-preroise
ground and
projecting

One per let 32 sq.
ft. plus 1 sq, ft.
for each 10 ft. of
frontage over 30 ft.
on a street but not
to exceed 64 sq. ft.

(143)

20 ft.
max.
for
ground

15 ft.
setback

Illumination may be
built into or attached
on to a &ign if the
development occupies
more than 5 30 ft. continuous froitage on a
street that the sign
will face (corner lots
©ay use tot.al frontage)
and not closer than
60 ft. to a property
not allowed an
illuminated siftn.
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22-23-vj - 22-33-19

^

SIGN

SIZE

HEIGHT

Flat

Flat sign may cover
15E of a wall area

Window

Window signs may not
exceed 8 sq. ft. per
use

>ntfd)

Monument

>) C-l 1On-premise
C-l-L ground or
C-V 1 projecting

Window

Attached to
a building

One per lot 65 sq.
ft. plus one sq. ft.
for each 4 ft. of
frontage over 30,
but not to exceed 128
sq. ft.

Flat or Wall

Temporary

See Section 22-33-18

1 One per lot 32 sq. ft.
plus 1 sq, ft. for
every 4 ft. of frontage over 30 to be a 1
maximum of 63 sq. ft.
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OTHER

Flat signs that are
exposed to dwellings
on adjacent properties
shall not be
illuminated

Window signs ehall
not be illuminated

One per lot 32 sq. ft. 1 6 ft.
plus one square foot
1 for every 10 feet of
frontage over 30 to a
maximum of 64 sq. ft.

Window signs shall
not exceed 12 sq» ft.
per use
|
25Z ot a wall area

Monument

LOCATION

25 ft.
max.

18-inch
minimum
setback

A monument sign can
only be utilized if
no ground or
projecting sign is
used

15 ft.
setback

Illumination may be
built into or
attached on to a sign
unless exposed to a
dwelling on adjacent
property

" mt-£lgh'S' 'SXpOSfcd'
to dwellings on adjacent property shall
not be Illuminated

6 ft.

18-inch
minimum
setback

A monument sign can
only be utilised if
no ground or projecting
sign is used

22-33-19 - 22-33-19

Sign Ordinance
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ZONE

SIGN

SIZE

»H 'I.I.I

LOCATION

HEIGHT

(4) C-2 ] On-premise
C-3 1 ground or
projecting

Illumination may be
j 18-inch
bailt into or atI setback on
ground or I tached to signs,
projecting, [ Rotation and subdued
light change may be
1 sign 300
allowed with conft, frontage or part ditional approval.
j Electee message
thereof
j center signs are conditional use in the
1 C-2 Zone and permitted use in the
C-3 Zore

45 ft,
max.

Balloon signs are
subject to conditional use

Balloon

K6<5t £Tgn may subj stitute for a ground
or projecting sign
but is subject to conditional use review.
The Planning Commissio;
may deny a sign or set
more restrictive con' ditions

lio it.

| Hoof

above
roof

; Window

OTHER

Window signs shall
not exceed 16 sq, ft*
per use

Promotional
Boards

1 sq. ft. for each
Max.
|
J
linear ft* of frontht, age to a maximum of i the sign 1
setback
20 sq. ft- per sign.
but not
more
1
than 10
ft.

Off-premise
for C-2
Zones only

65~£c."
high or j
25 ft.
above
1
freeway J

grade

J

level, I
which*- j
ever is
greater J

Maximum of I sign
per street front
and permanently
anchored to the
ground and subject
to Conditional Use

18-inch
J
min. set- J
back, no j
closer then!
30' from a j
residential!
2one boundary
without
Conditional!
Use
!
approval J

. ,L
(M3)

All sig,as must be
within 500' of the
freeway from which
the grade level of the
freeway is utilized to
compute the height
Spacing between offpremise signs shall
be 300r distance on
one street side

Sign Ordinance

SIGN

ZONE

(4) C-2 Toff-premise
C-3 ] for C-3 Zones
(cont'd) only

22-33-19 - 22-33-19

HEIGHT

SIZE
A maximum size of
1>000 sq. ft* exclusive of temporary
cutouts and
extensions

LOCATION

OTHER

65 ft. i
1 Setback
wax.
shall be the
sawe as re{height
br when quired In
the zone for
within
500' of other
a free- structures

Lay 25
ft.
above
grade
level,
whichever is
greatest

Flat

25% of a vail area
1 See Section 22-33-18

Temporary

OTH-I
VT2

65 ft.
max*

On-premise
ground or
projecting

Illumination may be
built into or attached
to sign* Electric
message center signs
are permitted -uses in
the M-l and M-2 Zones
Balloon signs are
subject to
Conditional Use

Balloon

Flat Wall or
construction

' 25% of a vail area

Roof

j Same as ground or
projecting sign

Window

18-in, setback on
ground or
projer.ting.
1 sign per
300 ft. of
frontage or
part thereof

10 ft. J Roof sign may substitute for a
above
roof

ground or projecting sign, but is
subject to Conditional Vse review.
The Planning Commission may deny a
sign or set more restrictive
conditions.

Window signs shall
not exceed 16 sq. ft J
per use

See Section 22-33-18

Temporary
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ZONE

22-33-19 - 22-33-19

SIZE

SIGN

(5) M-l Monument
M-2
(cont'd)

1 per lot 32 sq. ft U
plus 1 sq, ft* for
every A ft, of frontage over 30 to a
maximum of 64 sq- ft*

ft,

LOCATION
18-inch
minimum

65 ft. Setback shall
be the same
max,
height as required
or when | in the xone
within for other
500'
I structures
of a
1 freeway
25 ft.
'above
/grade
level,
whichever is
greatest

Off-premise

(6) F-R
F-M

HEIGHT

OTHER
A monument sign can
only be utilized if
no ground or
projecting sign is
] used
All signs must be
within 500 ft. of
the freeway from
which the grade
level of the freeway
is utilized to compute
height.
Spacing between offpremise sign shall
be 300 .ft* distance
on one street side

All regulated signs
shall require
Conditional Use
approval

Same as Sec.
22-33*19(3)
or C-l, C-l-L,
CV

1
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